In 1950 Mexico entered an economic takeoff and grew rapidly for more than 30 years. Growth stopped during the crises of 1982-1995, despite major reforms, including liberalization of foreign trade and investment. Since then growth has been modest. We analyze the economic history of Mexico 1877-2010. We conclude that the growth 1950-1981 was driven by urbanization, industrialization, and education and that Mexico would have grown even more rapidly if trade and investment had been liberalized sooner. If Mexico is to resume rapid growth -so that it can approach U.S. levels of income -it needs further reforms.
Introduction
In 1950 Mexico seemed posed for what Rostow (1960) later termed an economic takeoff:
following the worldwide Great Depression of the late 1920s and early 1930s, Mexico had begun to grow steadily. Workers were flowing into cities, manufacturing was increasing as a fraction of gross domestic product (GDP) as agriculture declined, and education was spreading throughout the country. Indeed, a spectacular takeoff occurred: Between 1950 and 1981, real To analyze the Mexican economic history corresponding to the data in figure 1, we follow a theoretical framework proposed by Kehoe and Ruhl (2010) , who in turn follow Prescott (1994, 2002) and Prescott (2002, 2007) . In this theory, a growing stock of technologies may be adopted at some cost. As countries implement these technologies, output grows. In the United States, continual adoption of improved technology generated a nearconstant growth rate over the period 1875-2010, as seen in figure 2. Technology adoption gives International Financial Statistics 2011.) We also analyze movements in GDP per working-age person, rather than GDP per capita, whenever possible because it is a better measure of an economy's ability to produce goods and services, especially in the context of the theory presented in sections 4 and 5. The use of the INEGI data set accounts for the minor differences in growth rates reported here and those in Ruhl (2010, 2011) . Details on the data are available at http://www.econ.umn.edu/~tkehoe.
rise to trend growth rates in the adopting countries close to 2 percent per year after capital and labor have had time to adjust. The absolute level of a particular country compared with the industrial leader depends on its institutions and economic policies. An economy that is far from the frontier can grow rapidly even with inefficient institutions and policies.
Mexico grew more rapidly than the United States during two significant periods: the Porfiriato of 1877-1910 -when its government encouraged foreign investment and developed the railway system -and during 1950-1981 -when the government implemented policies that promoted urbanization, industrialization, and education. The crises and stagnation of [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] were results both of the fiscal imbalances of 1970-1981 and of a deterioration in policies and institutions. We hypothesize that, by 1995, Mexico had arrived at the balanced-growth path that its policies and institutions warranted.
If Mexico is to grow rapidly -so that it can resume catching up to the United States -it needs to reform. We identify the problems in the Mexican economy at which reforms could be targeted: (1) inefficiency of the financial system, (2) lack of contract enforcement, (3) inflexibility in the labor market, and (4) monopolies in nonmanufacturing sectors like electricity, telecommunications, transportation, and petroleum extraction. The Mexican economy would also reap benefits from reducing violence related to drug trafficking.
We compare the experience of Mexico with that of China, another large, less-developed country. As did Mexico in the late 1980s and early 1990s, China opened itself to foreign trade and investment in the late 1990s and early 2000s. China's growth rate has been far higher than that of Mexico, however, even though China suffers from many of the same inefficiencies as
Mexico. In terms of our theory, the difference can be explained by the fact that China is still much poorer than Mexico and is reaping the benefits of its policies that promote urbanization, industrialization, and education, as did Mexico during . As China develops, problems like inefficiency in the financial system, lack of contract enforcement, and rigid labor markets will slow down growth there. The comparison with China is useful for thinking about the Mexican experience in that it provides evidence that, if liberalization of foreign trade and investment had accompanied the policies that promoted urbanization, industrialization, and education in 1950-1981, Mexico would have grown even more rapidly.
The analysis of this paper suggests a number of directions for future research. One direction would be to modify the one-sector growth model that we use in this paper to incorporate multiple sectors and to formalize Rostow's (1960) We date the modern economic history of Mexico as beginning in 1877, with the first inauguration of Porfirio Díaz. We divide 1877-2010 into the periods in figure 3 . In this section, we examine economic events that took place during 1877-1950, which set the stage for the takeoff experienced by the Mexican economy starting in 1950. Our principal source is Solís (2000).
1877-1910: Porfiriato
Porfirio Díaz was president of Mexico during 1877-1880 and 1884-1911 . The Revolución, the Mexican civil war that started in 1910, grew out of widespread social discontent with the Díaz regime. At the beginning of the Porfiriato, the economic geography of Mexico could be described as a collection of small economic units that functioned in an autarkic way, producing goods for self-consumption. The most important economic feature of the Porfiriato was the construction of railroads. Mexico became a nationwide market economy as the possibilities of exchange grew. In parallel, there were major investments in ports, telegraph, telephone, and electricity. The government played an important role in promoting foreign investment in railroads. The government granted concessions and paid subsidies per kilometer of railway built.
The principal source of funds for the construction of the railways was American investors.
When Díaz came to power in 1877 Mexico had 640 km of railways. During his first term as president, railways grew to a total of 1,074 km. Between 1880 and 1884, railways grew to a total of 5,731 km. As a result, Mexico had railways going from Mexico City to Veracruz, the main port in the Gulf of Mexico, and to the border with the United States. Railways went from 5,731 km to 19,748 km from 1884 to 1910. The expansion of railways had many effects on the Mexican economy. Exporting firms (raw materials from mining being the principal Mexican export) saw their costs reduced. Internal migration of workers, as a function of regional differences in wages, grew. New mining projects were undertaken, as the fall in transport costs made them profitable.
Economic growth in Mexico during the Porfiriato was impressive for that time: real GDP per capita grew by 2.1 percent per year during 1877-1910. According to Rostow (1960) , modern economic growth started in the United Kingdom in the early 19th century, and, according to Maddison (1995) , in the United Kingdom the average growth of real GDP per capita 1820-1900 was 1.2 percent per year. Between 1875 and 1910, real GDP per capita in the United States grew by 2.0 per year, as the United States overtook and passed the United Kingdom, whose growth rate during this period was only 0.9 percent per year, to become the world's industrial leader.
During this period, Mexico, whose growth rate was 2.1 percent per year, grew even faster. As the data in figure 4 illustrate, the Porfiriato was the period -except for the 1950-1981 import substitution period -in which Mexico was catching up to the United States. 2 We interpret the economic events of the Porfiriato as the beginning of an economic takeoff that was aborted by the events of the Revolución and the worldwide Great Depression that followed shortly after. 
1910-1928: Revolución and reconstruction
The Revolución, or civil war, that started in Mexico in 1910 as Francisco I. Madero led an uprising against Porfirio Díaz, resulted in a large fall in the population and a large destruction of the capital stock. The population of Mexico fell from 15.2 million to 14.3 million between 1910
and 1921, the period during which most of the armed conflict took place. Besides the reduction in population caused directly by the war, there was a large migration to the United States.
According to Solís (2000) , between 1910 and 1930, 600,000 Mexicans migrated. Another factor behind the fall in population was the flu epidemic [1918] [1919] . The migration to the United States and the flu epidemic must have disproportionately affected people with low education levels. According to census data, the number of people who knew how to read and write rose from 3.0 million in 1910 to 3.6 million in 1921, even as the overall population fell.
2 The data in figure 4 differ from those in figures 1 and 2 and those used in the rest of the paper except in figure 18. They are purchasing power parity real GDP numbers taken from Maddison (2010) Following the Depression, Mexico started growing again. Important institutions were created. In terms of politics, military leaders started losing ground to civilian leaders. Industrial workers and farmers were incorporated to the political system, through the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), which governed Mexico until the end of the 20th century.
Four important events took place in the interwar period: the nationalization of the oil industry, the development of the financial system, expenditure on public investment, and the agrarian reform.
The nationalization of the oil industry in 1938 had as a major consequence import substitution, as products that were previously imported were now produced domestically.
According to Solís (2000) , in broader terms, the management of the oil industry was now aimed at contributing to the development of the economy. 
Economic history since 1950
In terms of Rostow's (1960) (1996) and Solís (2000) .
In this section, we analyze this experience as well as the slowdown that has followed.
1950-1970: Import substitution and catch-up growth
Capital accumulation grew during the 1950s. During the 1950s, total investment grew faster than GDP. The government invested in public infrastructure: the oil industry, highways, health, and education. In terms of the loanable funds for investment emphasized by Rostow (1960) , it is worth stressing that the private domestic financial system was a limited source for such funds. During this period, the growth of the agricultural sector was related to industrialization.
Between 1945 and 1952, the agricultural sector grew more because of the extensive margin than because of a higher yield by hectare. The situation reversed between 1952 and 1956. This was due to a larger domestic and external demand, the growth of cities, and the process of industrialization. Industries demanded goods such as cotton.
After a balance of payments crisis in 1948, the government decided to protect the domestic production of consumption goods and imposed import quotas. The government also provided fiscal measures to foster the reinvestment of profits, and kept and expanded the policy of creation of new firms through subsidies, fiscal exemptions, and the support of Nacional Financiera, the largest of the government-operated development banks.
In 1950, for a large set of goods, there was no import substitution, as domestic industries already satisfied 95 percent of the domestic market for such products as textiles, food, beverages, and tobacco (classified as basic industries), shoes and soap (classified as consumption goods), and rubber, alcohol, and glass (classified as intermediate goods). For other products, there was a significant amount of import substitution. These goods were intermediates, durables, and capital goods. Cárdenas (1996) decomposes the sources of growth of industrial demand into domestic demand, external demand, import substitution, and structural change. Between 1950 and 1954, he finds that import substitution was negligible. Between 1954 and 1958 its contribution was 9 percent, a contribution smaller than in the 1930s. It is interesting to note that, between 1952 and 1958, 38 percent of private investment was destined to the purchase of imported machinery and equipment. In this sense, there was substantial technology adoption from abroad in that period.
According to Cárdenas (1996) , during the period 1958-1962, the contribution of import substitution to the growth of industrial demand was 22.3 percent due to a more protectionist trade policy. Over time, import substitution became difficult because it had to take place by producing intermediate and capital goods. The increase in GDP took place at the same time as urban growth. Figure 7 presents data on urbanization. Here the urban population is defined as that living in agglomerations of more than 2,500 inhabitants. Similar graphs are obtained for other definitions of urban population, but there are more data for this definition. There was also a reduction in the size of the agricultural sector and of mining. Figure 8 presents data on the sectoral composition of GDP. Migration from rural to urban areas was due to a lack of opportunities in the agricultural sector. The capital-labor ratio grew 7 percent on average during this period, which increased real wages.
Gross fixed capital formation grew at 10.3 percent between 1963 and 1970, increasing the investment to GDP ratio to 18.5 percent in 1970. Figure 9 shows the rapid spread of literacy. The private sector pushed for a process of Mexicanization (mexicanización) of the economy. Starting in the 1950s, but especially at the beginning of the 1960s, businessmen pressured the government to provide them with additional protection from foreign competition beyond tariffs. Laws and regulations were the instrument. Businessmen were also able to set barriers to entry in sectors that were considered strategic. The electricity industry was nationalized in 1960. As seen in figure 6 , the process of import substitution continued, now by producing domestically intermediate goods and capital goods, to make Mexico less dependent on foreign technology and on the need of having enough foreign currency to buy the goods that could not be produced domestically. Import substitution took place in the chemical and petrochemical industries, rubber, plastic, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, soap, detergents, and cosmetics.
Urban population in Mexico
Mexicanization resulted in a loss in the competitiveness of Mexican firms. As part of the policy of import substitution, the government set direct and indirect subsidies to the industrial sector. The policy of import substitution led to a reinforcement of the oligopolistic structure of the Mexican economy. The price and quality of goods produced were not competitive.
Protection of infant industries led to protection of inefficiency.
The government pursued a policy of Mexicanization of production, and to create empresas paraestatales, firms run by the government, based on the belief that it was better to borrow from abroad than to accept foreign direct investment (FDI), as during the Porfiriato. In 1961, a new mining law stated that fiscal incentives would be given only to firms in which the majority of capital was owned by Mexican nationals. New mining concessions would be granted to firms with 66 percent national capital. The low production of iron, steel and sulfur led the government to invest in their production. In the case of the petrochemical industry, the maximum percentage of foreign capital was 40 percent. protected not only from foreign products, but also from foreign capital.
1970-1981: Fiscal imbalances and collapse of import substitution
The first half of this period, 1970-1976 with the GDP deflator. Real GDP per working-age person grew at an average rate of 3.5 percent.
Government intervention in the economy had a negative impact on the economy. There was an increase in regulation and bureaucracy that discouraged the formation of new firms. The creation of firms managed by the government, and the purchase of firms by the government, increased the fiscal deficit. These firms represented projects of low social benefit. The economy was also hit by external shocks, such as the fall in the price of oil in international markets, and the rise in international interest rates, before the 1982 debt crisis.
During the administration of Luís Echeverría (1970 Echeverría ( -1976 , public sector deficit as a fraction of GDP went from 2.2 percent in 1970 to 9.0 percent in 1975. As the government borrowed in international markets to finance the public sector deficit, the current account deficit went from 1.8 percent of GDP in 1972 to 4.8 percent in 1975. The administration of Echeverría ended with a devaluation of the peso after 22 years of fixing the exchange rate at 12.50 pesos per dollar.
During the administration of José López Portillo (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) , the discovery of massive oil fields in early 1978 had a significant impact on economic policy. According to Cárdenas (1996) , These years of reforms preceded the 1994-1995 crisis. Kehoe (1995b) provides a detailed timeline of the crisis and the events leading up to it. During 1994, several political and economic negative events took place, in the months before the devaluation of the peso in December. The peso-dollar exchange rate had been allowed to fluctuate within a predetermined band. The upper bound of this band was widened, letting it increase periodically. The government issued a growing amount of short-term dollar-indexed debt, the Tesobono debt. It became the largest source of short-term borrowing for the government, surpassing the amount of short-term peso debt in circulation, the CETES debt.
In the last quarter of 1994, the situation worsened. In late December, the government abandoned the fixed exchange rate regime. The peso devalued considerably. In early January of 1995, the government was unable to roll over the Tesobono debt. The 1994-1995 crisis was a liquidity crisis, due to the short maturity and dollar indexation of the Tesobono debt: there was a public sector surplus in 1994. Furthermore, the ratio of total debt to GDP was not at historical highs. On the other hand, the Tesobono debt grew rapidly during 1994. Stocks of other kinds of debt remained stagnant, and some decreased. The growth in the stock of Tesobonos had two consequences, as Cole and Kehoe (1996) point out: First, it increased the ratio of dollar-indexed debt to international reserves; and, second, it reduced the average maturity of government debt.
By July 1994, the stock of Tesobonos was larger than the international reserves of the Banco de México. At the same time, the average maturity of government bonds had fallen from a maximum during 1994 of 305.8 days to 277.8 days (Cole and Kehoe 1996) . During the end of December, Mexico abandoned its exchange-rate regime and let the peso float. At the end of December 1994, the stock of Tesobonos was much bigger than international reserves, and maturity had fallen to 205.7 days.
One important consequence of the crisis was its negative impact on the banking system.
During 1988-1994 there was a large increase in the ratio of bank credit to GDP, as seen in figure   5 . The rise in interest rates implied a large debt burden on consumers and on firms. There was a rise in past due loan payments. The government took the decision of rescuing the banking sector. Initially, this rescue was carried out through the Fondo Bancario de Protección al Ahorro (FOBAPROA), a deposit insurance public institution created in the previous administration. Solís (2000) estimates the cost of this rescue at 15 percent of GDP.
The financial crisis of 1994-1995 had a large negative impact on economic activity. Real GDP per working-age person fell 8.4 percent in 1995. Growth accounting indicates that most of this fall in GDP per working-age person was due to a large fall in total factor productivity (TFP).
That TFP fell by a large amount is robust to measuring it assuming variable capital utilization. Meza and Quintin (2007) report that capital utilization can account for only one-third of the drops in TFP in past crises in Argentina and Southeast Asia and the 1994-1995 crisis in Mexico.
This is a reminder that theories that want to explain the economic performance of Mexico have to be able to account for large falls in TFP, as well as an overall lack of growth in TFP outside crisis periods.
1995-2007: Recovery and slow growth
Two important features of the 1995-2007 period are the rapid growth after the crisis that started in December 1994, and the fact that the economy grew on average at the same rate as did the United States: real GDP per working-age person grew at an average annual rate of 1.7 percent in Mexico, the same rate as that in the United States. Another reform had to do with the mortgage market. Liens on property were substituted by trusts in which the bank is at the same time the trustee and the beneficiary of the trust. If a borrower does not pay, the bank can evict her and sell the house in an auction. A third change aimed at fostering credit had to do with digitalizing property registers, in a pilot program in some northern states. This reform was aimed at providing more information to creditors, given that in Mexico it is commonly uncertain whether a person who owns land actually has title to it.
Finally, the Fox government allowed the entry of more participants into the banking industry, granting a bank charter to six retailers. Once again, the data in figure 5 indicate that these reforms did little to expand private credit. During 2010, the Mexican economy recovered partially from the crisis. Real GDP per working-age person increased 3.2 percent. It still had not recovered its pre-crisis level, however.
A question of obvious importance is whether Mexico will grow at a higher rate than in the past after the crisis is over, or if it will continue to display stagnation, conditional on a possible new global recession.
The power of productivity
In this section, we analyze the performance of the Mexican economy during 1950-2010 using the one-sector neoclassical model. We argue that to understand the evolution of real GDP, we need to understand the evolution of TFP. In the next section, we propose an extension of the model to analyze the evolution of TFP in Mexico during 1950-2010.
The model has the aggregate production function
Here, t K is the capital stock in period t, t L hours worked, t C aggregate consumption, and t I aggregate investment. We subsume government consumption into t C and government investment into t I . The parameter t A is TFP. The capital stock depreciates geometrically,
The stand-in household has the utility function
Here t N is the working-age population and h is the maximum amount of hours available for work per person. The household's budget constraint is
Here the wage rate t w and the rental rate t r are compatible with profit maximization by competitive firms with the production function (1):
(1 )
There is a tax on capital income with a tax rate t  and tax revenues ( )
which are redistributed in a lump-sum form to the household.
Suppose that both TFP and the working-age population grow at constant rates, L N , which are constant. It is this fact that motivates the growth accounting employed by Prescott (2002, 2007) . This growth accounting rearranges terms in the production function to decompose the determinants of output into three factors. The advantage of this decomposition is that each of the three factors leads us to examine a different set of shocks and changes in policies when studying changes in output:
In this growth accounting, growth in human capital shows up as growth in TFP.
Fluctuations in factor utilization also show up as fluctuations in TFP, although this is probably more important in studying business cycle moments, like the 1994-1995 financial crisis in Mexico, than it is in studying growth over a decade or longer. The growth accounting in equation (8), in contrast to that of Solow (1957) and Denison (1962) , takes into account the feature of the neoclassical growth model that, in a balanced-growth path, as technological growth occurs, households save so as to keep the capital-output ratio constant. Researchers like De
Gregorio and Lee (2004) and Bosworth and Collins (2008) , who use a growth accounting that looks at increases in output per worker as a function of variables that include capital per worker, typically find increases in TFP and increases in capital roughly equally important in accounting for growth. Our growth accounting -which imputes to the productivity factor the increase in capital necessary to keep the capital-output ratio constant and imputes to the capital factor only the increases in the capital-output ratio, that is, capital deepening -finds that capital is much less important and that increases in productivity are typically the driving force of economic growth. The calibration of the parameters of the model and the computation of its equilibrium follow Bergoeing et al. (2002 Bergoeing et al. ( , 2007 . To estimate the consumption weight  , we use the intratemporal first-order condition from the household's utility maximization problem,
Growth accounting for the United States
We set h equal to 100 hours per week and average over 1950-1960 data to estimate 0.257
To calibrate the tax rate, we use the intertemporal first-order condition from the household's utility maximization problem, assuming that t    is constant,
We set 0.980
 
and average over 1950-1960 data to estimate 0.509
. We have included a tax on capital in the model because Bergoeing et al. (2002 Bergoeing et al. ( , 2007 Bergoeing et al. (2002 Bergoeing et al. ( , 2007 argue that in the late 1980s a series of fiscal reforms in Mexico changed the incentives to accumulate capital. To capture the impact of these reforms we run another numerical experiment, identical to the first except that in 1988 we change t  from 0.509 to 0.254 and leave it at this level. We model this change as unexpected by households.
The model now does much better in tracking the performance of the Mexican economy over 1982-2010. Our conclusion is that, if we take into account a major change in incentives to accumulate capital in the 1980s and if we can understand the evolution of TFP in Mexico, we understand most of the evolution of the Mexican macroeconomy over 1950-2010.
It is worth noting that this model can be modified to include foreign trade and investment, as in Kehoe and Ruhl (2009) . This modification, especially the modeling of the inflow of foreign investment in the early 1990s and its sudden stop in 1995-1996, can improve the performance of the model even further.
Many other authors, going back to the late 1950s, have realized that understanding TFP growth is essential for understanding economic growth. Of particular relevance for the theoretical framework that we sketch out in the next section are Lewis (2004) and Prescott (1994, 2002) . Lewis (2004) uses case studies of different countries to show that productivity in other sectors, besides just manufacturing, is essential for determining relative income levels across countries. He also uses anecdotal evidence to argue that it is government policies that discourage the adoption of the best available technologies from the rest of the world that keeps countries relatively poor. Prescott (1994, 2002) develop a model in which it is government policies and institutions like monopolies that impede new technology adoption that keep productivity, and therefore income per capital, low.
This growth-retarding impact of monopolies is especially relevant for Mexico, where, in the early 1990s, the privatization of large empresas paraestatales in nonmanufacturing sectors granted monopoly rights to the purchasers of these firms. Although this privatization policy maximized the revenues accrued from privatization, it resulted in inefficient monopolies in telecommunications and transportation.
Theoretical framework
In this section, we use the theoretical framework developed by Kehoe and Ruhl (2010) to analyze Mexico's growth experience. In the next section, we use this framework to compare
Mexico's experience with that of China. Kehoe and Ruhl (2010) follow Prescott (2002, 2007) in using the economic performance of the United States over the past century or more as the starting point for our theory. Let us focus again on the data on economic growth in the United States in figure 2. Notice how close these data are to a constant growth path with 2 percent growth per year. The average growth rate during this period was 1.91 percent per year.
(It was 1.97 percent per year over 1875-2007.) Kehoe and Prescott hypothesize that the nearconstant growth in the United States is driven by near-constant growth in the stock of knowledge useful in production. It should be stressed that this stock of knowledge is not measured TFP.
Measured TFP depends on the stock of knowledge but also depends on the efficiency with which factors of production are allocated across firms and sectors in the economy.
The data on growth in the United States presented in figure 2 are fascinating and invite speculation and theorizing. It is difficult, for example, to reconcile them with the once-popular endogenous growth theories of researchers like Romer (1986 in Mexico, a country that is behind the industrial leader and simply needs to adapt best practice from elsewhere. Kehoe and Ruhl (2010) hypothesize that the stock of knowledge, which has increased very smoothly over the past century or more, can be adopted, perhaps at some cost by countries that are behind the industrial leader. This would give rise to trend growth of close to 2 percent per year, at least after capital and labor have had time to adjust. In this framework, changes in policies -such as the development of railroads during the Porfiriato and of the policies to promote urbanization, industrialization, and education during the recovery from the Revolución and the Great Depression and the import substitution period that followed -affect only the levels of a balanced-growth path. Long-run growth remains at 2 percent per year. The absolute level that a specific country is at compared to the industrial leader depends on its institutions and economic policies. Changes in these institutions and economic policies can cause depressions or booms. Eventually, however, if institutions and policies stabilize, and after capital and labor have adjusted, the country returns to trend growth.
How do we interpret the economic history of Mexico in terms of this theory? Changes in economic policies during the Porfiriato and the recovery from the Revolución and the Great Depression led to catch-up growth. Policy mistakes made during the end of the import substitution period 1970-1981 led to the crises that followed. After 1995, we interpret Mexico as being in the balanced-growth path that its policies and institutions warrant.
What are the factors that impede Mexico from continuing catch-up growth and reaching levels of income like that in its neighbors and trade partners, Canada and the United States? A number of researchers have addressed this question and conclude that Mexico's slow growth, despite its reforms over 1985-1995, is a consequence of its inefficient financial system and lack of contract enforcement. Bergoeing et al. (2002 Bergoeing et al. ( , 2007 compare the growth trajectories of Chile and Mexico following the financial crises they both suffered in the 1980s; Chile recovered rapidly while Mexico stagnated. They conclude that the crucial differences between policies in Mexico and Chile are those related to the banking system and to bankruptcy proceedings. Krueger and Tornell (1999) and Tornell et al. (2003) also find that the lack of credit, particularly in the nontradable goods sector, was responsible for the poor growth in Mexico. The data in figure 4 show the very low levels of credit that the Mexican financial sector provides the private sector. In 1950-1981 the economy was able to grow in spite of the inefficient financial sector because the government did much of the investment. There are other barriers to growth in Mexico. We have already discussed the monopolies in electricity, telecommunications, transportation, and petroleum extraction. In recent years, violence associated with drug trafficking has also been a barrier to growth.
Mexico versus China
China is another large, less-developed country that has opened itself to foreign trade and investment, and to which Mexico is often compared. Growth in recent years in China has been spectacular. As the data in figures 13, 14, and 15 show, the same forces that drove rapid growth in Mexico during have been at play more recently in China: urbanization, industrialization, and education. Notice that in figure 13 China is still substantially behind Mexico in terms of urbanization and that in figure 14 it is still substantially behind in terms of industrialization.
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It is only in the data on education in figure 15 where China is ahead of
Mexico. Identifying an inefficient financial system and lack of contract enforcement as the factors that retard Mexican growth generates a puzzle because China also suffers from these problems.
Urban population in
China has been able to grow with a poorly functioning financial and legal system, despite the lack of significant reforms to these systems (Rawski 1994, Allen, Qian, and Qian 2005) .
Studying the Chinese experience, Guariglia and Poncet (2008) go so far as to question whether an efficient financial system is necessary for growth.
What factors have driven growth in China, and are these factors present in Mexico? Studies of China's output growth, such as Brandt and Zhu (2009) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009), conclude that productivity growth arising from the reallocation of resources across firms is key.
It would be tempting to hypothesize that the mechanisms that generated productivity growth in manufacturing in China were not present in Mexico, but López-Córdova (2003) finds that trade and foreign investment reforms resulted in large increases in productivity in the manufacturing sector in Mexico, especially in those sectors most exposed to foreign trade. This suggests that the problem in Mexico is not a lack of productivity growth in manufacturing, but in the rest of the economy.
Our solution to the puzzle of why China has grown rapidly and why Mexico has not is that China is still at a lower level of development than Mexico and the barriers to growth in Mexico -especially the inefficient financial system and lack of contract enforcement -have not yet affected China. Some evidence for this hypothesis is the comparison of the data in figures 13 and 14 with those in figures 7 and 8. We see that China still has a far larger fraction of its population living in rural areas than does Mexico and that its economy still depends far more on agriculture. More direct evidence comes from comparing income levels. To compare China with Mexico in terms of absolute level of income, we use the purchasing power parity (PPP) real GDP data published by the World Bank (2008 Bank ( , 2011 . Figure 18 depicts the data.
China has been growing more rapidly than Mexico, but it is still substantially poorer in 2010. In the theory that we propose, it is easier to grow faster than the industrial leader when an economy is far behind. An economy like China -or Mexico in 1950-1981 -can grow rapidly even with an inefficient financial system, lack of contract enforcement, and rigidities in the labor market. As the country gets closer to the industrial leader, however, rapid growth stops and the country levels off at the trend growth rate of GDP per working-age person of 2 percent per year or a little less. This seems to have occurred in Western Europe in the early 1970s, in Japan in the early 1990s, and in Chile in the late 1990s, to mention a few cases. How far short of the industrial leader the country levels off depends on its institutions and economic policies. Chile, for example, after spectacular growth following its great depression in the early 1980s, has had a level of real GDP per working-age person and a growth rate similar to those in Mexico since about 1998. Unless China continues to reform, we can expect economic growth there to slow down sharply at some point.
It is an open question whether or not this slowdown will occur when China is still behind Mexico in terms of real GDP per working-age person. reforms does Mexico need to enact to resume rapid catch-up growth? We hypothesize that these are reforms that eliminate the barriers to growth of an inefficient financial system, lack of contract enforcement, and rigidities in the labor market. In terms of more specific reforms, promoting competition in nonmanufacturing sectors like electricity, telecommunications, and transportation would spur productivity growth. So would allowing private investment in petroleum extraction. Reducing violence related to drug trafficking would also have a positive impact. 6 Our theory suggests that it may be more fruitful to compare Mexico to economies at a similar level of economic development. Brazil is a frequently cited example. It is a country that has about 80 percent of the real GDP per working-age person of Mexico in 2010 but that has experienced higher rates of growth than Mexico since 2000. Over the period 1995-2007, however, the growth rate of GDP per working age person in Brazil has been 1.1 percent per year, less than Mexico's 1.7 percent per year. Despite high growth in 2009 and 2010, it has yet to be seen whether Brazil is performing significantly better than Mexico.
growth model discussed in sections 4 and 5 to a model like those in Buera and Kaboski (forthcoming) and Echevarria (1997 Echevarria ( , 2008 with primary, manufacturing, and service sectors.
The analysis in Xu (2011) indicates that it would also be useful to disaggregate manufacturing into intermediate goods and final goods. With such a model, we could quantify more precisely the costs and benefits of import substitution during the period of Mexico's fast growth . With such a model, we could also extend the theory of barriers to growth and transitions to higher balanced-growth paths sketched out in section 5 to incorporate the stages of growth studied by Rostow (1960) .
